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1. Executive Summary 
This paper begins by setting out the constitutional framework of the Russian Federation and 
demonstrates that, over time, Russia's regions are beginning to exert greater control over their 
internal economic and commercial relationships. In this context, the theoretical underpinnings 
of second level economic policies are considered. It is noted that the increasingly active role 
of regional authorities in determining economic policy is, particularly in times of crisis, 
understandable, though not particularly efficient or effective. Indeed, these policies can have 
serious implications for macroeconomic stabiiisation. Finally, the implications such policies 
have for Russia's accession to the WTO are highlighted and a distinction is drawn between 
measures which are expressly forbidden as a consequence of multilateral trading rules and 
those which are subject to reduction commitments or need to be notified for transparency 
reasons. 
2. Background 
The political and administrative organisation of federalism in Russia is a unique blend of de 
jure federative organisation and de facto elements of confederation and of a unitary state, an 
organisational blend that reflects the country's size, diversity and Soviet legacy. Russia's 
subnational governments consist of 89 regions which have very different administrative and 
political status. The Federation comprises 21 republics, 50 oblasts, 6 hays and 10 
autonomous okrugs, plus two metropoiitan centres (Moscow and St Petersburg). This group 
is collectively known in the Russian Constitution as the 89 "subjects of the federation." Each 
of the 89 regions are further subdivided into more than 2,000 districts (municipalities and 
rayons). All local administrations within a region are technically responsible to the regional 
government and are subject to regional regulations, though each local administration has an 
independent budgetary and administrative status. 
The Federation Treaty of 1992 provides the framework for federal-provincial relations. This 
defines the division of sub-federal and federal divisions of responsibility as long as these do 
not contravene Russia's constitution. Article 71 of the constitution reserves exclusive rights 
for the federal authorities including, inter alia, the authority of the central bank to issue 
money, financing of the court system from the federal budget, transportation and 
communication links across regions, the development and control of energy. The constitution 
also details (Article 72) joint federal and sub-federal management of issues ranging from 
international relations and taxation to the selection of law enforcement officials. The 
Government's political responsibility to the regions is also spelled out in the constitution. In 
effect, this is to ensure that all 89 provincial administrations are "equal in their relations" with 
the central Government." 
While what has been outlined above appears straightforward, the situation is complicated 
somewhat by the fact that over 30 regions have drawn up their own constitutions and several 
more are in the pipeline. Most of these are believed to directly contravene the Federation's 
own constitution. Notwithstanding this, none have been tested in court. In addition, a hrther 
eighteen regions have signed 'bilateral' treaties with the central Government. Most of these 
are modelled on the 1994 treaty signed between Tatarstan and the central Government. 
Among other things, this provided for a special tax arrangement with the central authorities 
and allowed Tatarstan to develop its own 'foreign economic policy.' In effect these 'special 
arrangements have meant that a significant number of regional authorities have developed 
their own methods and mechanisms for regulating internal trade. 
The separate arrangements outlined above do appear to undercut the Federal Government's 
claim that Russian law can be consistently enforced across the country. The Government 
recognised this as early as 1991, by establishing the office of Presidential Representative to 
be the 'eyes and ears' of the central authorities in the regions. The success of this particular 
policy has, however, been rather mixed as the ongoing difficulties in the Russian Far East 
illustrate. Indeed, the increased independence of regional administrations and the lack of 
central Government oversight has seen the rapid rise since 1992 of what may in economic 
terms be described as a regional policy administered at the sub national level. In essence, this 
has involved the spatial targeting of assistance/regulation in sub national areas that are 
perceived to be under-performing over a range of economic indicators. Sub-national 
measures may also be implemented in an effort to protect local living standards by, for 
instance, preventing the out flow of subsidised products to neighbouring regions where 
market prices prevail. 
In common with most areas of economics, there are unresolved debates in the underlying 
theory,' but an assessment of regional economics in Russia is further burdened by the 
unreliability of data and the unresolved debate at the Centre as to the appropriate 
geographical level of application. Some economists take the view that extensive regional 
policies directed either by the Centre or indeed by the regional administration are 
unnecessary and even harmful, because they impede the operation of the market and 
perpetuate a culture of dependency with serious macroeconomic implications. Others argue 
that, for microeconomic reasons, regional policies can play a crucial role in the development 
of regions with or without intrinsic economic advantages and that these can be immensely 
successful. There are therefore essentially two main approaches: the free marketlneo-classical 
approach and interventionist theories, both of which draw on Ricardo's principles of 
comparative advantage. 
1 The literature on regional policy is extensive. Minford and Stoney (1991), however, offer arguably the most 
useful outline of the key issues. 
According to the theory of comparative advantage, regions should specialise in those areas of 
production in which they have a natural advantage over other areas. In this case, Krasnodar 
should focus on its comparative advantage in agricultural production, while Kamchatka 
should focus on natural resource utilisation. The comparative success of some regions is often 
explained therefore by differential resource endowments, though this approach may only take 
one so far. Indeed, Russia's regions provide a usefbl case in point. The differences in real 
incomes between the regions of Russia is not determined by the difference in resource 
endowments, but by what Kaldor2 has called the "unequal incidence of development in 
industrial activities." The major flaw in comparative advantage theory is that manufacturing 
capacity and services are not in fact natural endowments. 
Mainstream economic theory relies heavily on freely finctioning markets for its policy 
prescriptions. Where these do not exist, it is contended that they should be created. Wage 
flexibility and labour mobility are believed to be the key to solving regional problems. The 
argument runs that capital will be attracted to areas where it can enjoy a greater share of the 
rewards. This means that labour must be prepared to take less so that wage 'flexibility' is a 
question of reducing the reward to labour in the production process. One way of avoiding the 
market which is commonly utilised in the Russian context is for regional administrators to 
provide subsidies or other incentives for production to ensure that capital does not shift to 
other regions, or indeed close down altogether. The free market approach also suggests that 
labour should be encouraged to seek work outside its own region. Regional policy in so far as 
there is one should be directed only at removing obstacles to the fkee movement of labour. It 
is immediately apparent that this model does not tell us much that is usefbl about the 
approach regional Governments in Russia have adopted to local economic conditions. 
The second approach is a more interventionist one and better explains the manner in which 
Russia's regional authorities have become involved in regulating internal economic relations. 
The model has its foundations in the work of Myrdal (1957) and of Kaldor (1970) and may 
be characterised as the school of 'cumulative causation.' The argument is that a region 
possessing an initial advantage in a particular area will be able to sustain this and even 
increase its lead through increasing returns to scale. These are not just the economies of large 
scale production commonly considered, but the cumulative advantages accruing fiom the 
growth of industry itself - the development of skill and know-how; the opportunities for the 
easy communication of ideas and experience; and the opportunity of ever increasing 
differentiation of processes and specialisation in human activities. This perspective is 
consistent with Verdoorn's law which states that the rate of productivity and the rate of 
growth of output are positively related. This suggests that growth is a circular and self- 
sustaining process, meaning that initial disparities in growth become exaggerated over time: 
Kaldor (1970, p. 339). 
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success breeds hrther success, while failure breeds further failure. If a region like Saratov 
establishes an advantage in a processing activity, then the gap between it and its rivals can 
widen and the gains may become cumulative. There is therefore a virtuous spiral of growth 
and a vicious spiral of decline. The argument suggests that, in the absence of an active 
regional authority, unsuccessful regions will sink, while successfbl regions with activist 
Governments will swim. In the case of Russia, regions like Novgorod, Moscow, St 
Petersburg etc, already have various advantages over the regions in the Russian Far East or 
the far North in terms of manufacturing and processing. One could argue that the active 
support of local authorities would tend to maintain or enhance this advantage at the expense 
of poorer regions. This is an opposite conclusion to that of the free market approach and, not 
surprisingly, is used to justify a different more interventionist approach to regional 
development. 
The problems with this approach are numerous. The international evidence is mounting that 
regional policies, particularly those which distort market signals (ie protectionist measures) 
can substantively hinder macroeconomic development by restricting efficiency and 
effectiveness. In effect, the international evidence, both theoretical and empirical suggests 
that activist regional policies may in the short run improve a region's level of economic 
development, but in the medium to long term not only will the region's overall development 
slow down, but more importantly, the efforts at the Centre at macroeconomic stability and 
improving eficiency and effectiveness will be significantly ham~ered .~  
In the context of a changing political system and the financial crisis in August 1998, the 
evolution of inter-governmental economic and trading relations in Russia has been a rapid 
and somewhat chaotic decentralisation of economic and commercial responsibilities. This 
has had serious implications for commercial activity at the sub-national level. 
3. Multilateral Trade Rules Affecting Sub-National Entities 
In the trade technician's jargon, sub national measures are known as second level obligations. 
These are the expectations under the various WTO Agreements of central governments in 
respect of provinces or regions constituting their jurisdiction. 
The key clause of relevance to this discussion is contained in GATT Article XXIV: 12 which 
defines second level obligations thus: 
The literature on this subject is extensive. The theoretical and empirical jutifkation for opposing second level 
economic policies because of their impact on overall macroeconomic conditions is well covered by, inter alia, 
Gudgin (1 995, 18-63) and Swales (1997,73-85). 
"Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it 
to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local 
governments and authorities within its territories." 
This, however, is not the only reference to sub national obligations in the WTO agreements. 
Such commitments are contained in Article 3.1 of the TBT, Point 14 of the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of the GATT 1994 related to paragraph 12 of Article XXIV, Article 1 of 
GATS, Annex 3, section 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement and Article 6 of TRIMS. 
This is an obligation which WTO member states take extremely seriously. It is an issue which 
Russian negotiators have only recently begun to focus on in any substantive fashion. It is 
important in this context to understand precisely the obligations the various WTO 
Agreements impose on the membership. The Agreements provide for a number of 
permissible measures which are subject to reduction commitments over a specified period. 
They also prohibit a number of activities, while others are allowed but must be registered 
with the WTO for transparency reasons. This is an important distinction. 
Additionally, according to the terms of the Agriculture Agreement, all non tariff barriers 
(NTBs) on agricultural products, such as quotas and import restrictions4 must be converted 
into tariff equivalents (ie customs duties) and bound accordingly in members' schedules. 
Members are not allowed to introduce or re-introduce any measures of the type subject to 
tariffication. Conversion to a tariff-based system must reflect the difference between the 
average internal prices and representative average world prices. 
The WTO Working Party in Geneva which is considering Russia's accession has received 
considerable evidence of the kinds of restrictions faced by companies operating at the sub 
federal level in Russia. These range fiom price controls, additional standards and certification 
requirements, re-establishment of monopoly purchasing, uneven enforcement of customs 
regulations and so on. In addition, there has been a gradual increase over the past three years 
in sub national support for both the industrial and agricultural sector. In this context, regional 
officials in the Russian Federation will be expected to re-examine their internal trading 
regime. There is evidence in a number of OECD papers on the subject that Russia's regions 
have in place measures which are expressly forbidden under WTO rules. Detailed work 
undertaken on the subject suggests that regional price controls are in place in some regions. 
Khabarovsk Kray for instance, has a Regional Pricing Policy Committee which last year 
issued Decree Number 234-1 specifying the maximum wholesale and retail prices for 
A number of the OECD papers on Russia's regions, as weil as a New Zealand paper on sub federal restrictions 
list a number of quantitative restrictions which will need to be eliminated by the regions before Russia joins the 
WTO. The most obvious example of difllculties in this area is Bashkorto~stan which has in place no fewer than 
eleven quotas on agricultural goods (OECD 1999, p. 9). 
agricultural products. For instance, prices for a kilogram of butter may not exceed US0.90 
(regardless of currency  fluctuation^).^ In the same region, Governor Ishaev issued a resolution 
imposing an effective 'export ban' on "strategic products.' This included a blanket prohibition 
on the movement of food stuffs (meat, cooking oil, flour and dairy products), he1 and oil out 
of the region. The Head of the Regional Interior Affairs Directorate in Khabarovsk, Anatoly 
Zolotaryov has been charged with reporting directly to the Governor on a monthly basis with 
a list of the number of vehicles detained. On 7 September last year, the Regional 
Administration of Nizhny Novgorod announced price limitations on agricultural goods, 
including poultry, dairy products, meat, grain etc. The new prices would be set "according to 
the ability of the local population to pay, not according to world prices" was how one local 
politician, First Deputy Governor Batyrev, described the new p01icy.~ Even St Petersburg, 
long a model for a liberal trading regime in Russia, has instituted a range of additional 
barriers prohibited under the SPS Agreement and the Agriculture Agreement. 
Additionally, New Zealand has evidence that a number of other regions have in place 
agricultural subsidies which will need to be included in Russia's agriculture support tables 
and are subject to the usual reduction commitments on accession. In the region of Vladirnir, 
local dairy farmers receive a direct subsidy of US$O.40 from the local administration per litre 
of milk produced. This system has been in place since 1996. The local Administration in the 
Jewish Autonomous Region is providing soy bean farmers with a direct "payment" in the 
form of free or sharply discounted he1 and fertilisers. This system has been in place since 
1995. Grain farmers in Krasnodarsky Kray receive US$O. 10 from the local administration for 
every loaf of bread produced by the local (state owned) bakery. In Nizhny Novgorod 
agricultural subsidies comprise 10% of the regional budget. In 1998 about 80% of this was 
spent (this is a greater proportion than other regions manage). According to the local 
Administration, such subsidies contribute about 2.5 or 3% of the total value of all agricultural 
sales. In 1998, some 10-1 1% of the Republic of Tatarstan's budget is committed to 
agricultural subsidies (this is down fiom 25% in 1997). About 80-90% of these commitments 
are actually paid out. 50% of the agricultural support goes to fertility programmes (seeds, 
fertiliser, pedigree breeding); 30% to modernisation programmes (eg. long term no-interest 
credits); some scientific research; and some subsidies direct to farmer, especially to producers 
of milk and poultry. These subsidies account for 20% of the final value of milk products, and 
25% in the case of poultry.' The important point about all of these programmes is that none of 
them appear in any of the relevant documentation tabled by the Russian Delegation to the 
WTO. Under the terms of the Agriculture Agreement and the Secretariat's Technical Note 
ACC/4, all relevant information about subsidy programmes at the sub-federal level needs to 
be declared. 
- -- - 
Kommersant Daily 29 September 1998 
Kommersant Daily 14 September 1998 
7 All of the examples are drawn fiom the New Zealand paper circulated in December 1998 at the WTO Working 
Party considering Russia's accession and an updated version thereof from Vitalis (1999). 
Finally, a number of the regions have provisions or programmes such as Green Box measures 
or similar which, while not in violation of any specific Agreement, will need to be notified to 
the central Government and, via the Government, to the WTO Working Party in Geneva. 
These are not isolated incidents. Indeed, in December 1998, New Zealand circulated evidence 
of no fewer than forty violations of WTO Agreements to members of the Russia WTO 
Accession Working Party. The OECD appended this paper to its own report on trade 
distorting practices in the Russian Federation.' 
Some of the key issues for consideration by the Russian federation include the f~l lowing:~ 
How aware are regional offtcials of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures when drafting policies to aid local producers? 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures establishes three categories of 
subsidies and the procedures to be followed in dealing with them. The three categories are 
prohibited subsidies (subsidies contingent on export performance or the use of domestic 
rather than imported goods); actionable subsidies (subsidies injuring the domestic industry of 
another member causing nullification or impairment of benefits or causing serious prejudice 
to the interests of another member); and nun-actionable subsidies (subsidies which may be 
maintained by members). The Agreement details an accelerated timetable for dispute 
settlement cases arising from the application of the Agreement. It also sets. out the conditions 
under which countervailing duties may be imposed. It does not apply to agriculture subsidies 
which are covered in the Agriculture Agreement. 
It is clear that most regional administrations are not aware of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. This is rather worrying. Any regional subsidy which falls under the 
terms of the first two categories could have serious implications for both the region and the 
central authorities. The third category of subsidies still needs to be notified to the WTO for 
transparency reasons. 
How might such aid programmes distort trade with other regions in Russia? 
It is clear that the kind of assistance provided in many of Russia's regions distort internal 
trading patterns. Indeed, the use of subsidies in Russia is extremely inefficient. Distortions in 
a local economy in the form of regional funding for particular activities causes 
ibid. 
The subsequent issues posed were originally set by the OECD to guide the 11-12 March 1999 Seminar's 
discussion. 
capitallinvestment to flow into inefficient industries or sectors. Such subsidies either diminish 
or contribute little to a local economy's overall growth pattern. 
Having said that market failure resulting in incorrect price signals could theoretically justify 
some form of local intervention. However, when market failure results in prices that do not 
reflect the true opportunity costs of an activity, international experience suggests that it is 
highly unlikely that a local administration would have superior information about opportunity 
costs or the ability to tailor a set of subsidies that result in "correct" price signals and an 
efficient allocation of resources. 
How widespread are regional product testing and certification centres? What 
type of mutual recognition arrangements exist among regions? In what ways 
might regional product testing and certification become a burdensome trade 
barrier? 
The kinds of standards and certification procedures being worked on in the Sverdlosk oblastiO 
(the attempts to introduce IS0 9000 series quality controls) are a helpful illustration of how 
regional product testing for export may add value to a good. On the other hand, there are a 
number of regions which have introduced their own testing laboratories and demand that 
foreign products meet a local standard which is often more rigorous than the national 
standard. There have been other cases in the Russian Far East, for instance, where the testing 
of h i t  and vegetables is undertaken on precisely the same terms as the national requirement. 
In effect, the exporter has to pay twice for the same battery of tests. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that such regional product testing facilities are quite extensive and are on the 
increase. 
What type of mutual recognition arrangements exist among the regions? 
There are currently no mutual recognition arrangements among the regions. Indeed, 
certification arrangements are frequently competing ones and one region will often not accept 
the testing regime of another. This is the case, for instance, between the testing regimes of 
Primorsky Kray and Kamchatka. 
In what ways might regional product testing and certification become a 
burdensome barrier? 
'O Sub-National Legislative and Administrative Policies Affecting Foreign Trade: Sverdlovsk Oblast, OECD, 
November 1998, p 19 
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Clearly Russia will have a serious problem in the WTO context when it is discovered that 
regional requirements in some cases are more rigorous and more expensive than the national 
obligations. No foreign exporter wants to have to go through two testing procedures one more 
expensive and protracted than the other. 
Which regional economic measures (financial aid and subsidies, standards and 
certification, state orders, anti-monopoly policy, customs administration, 
environmental policy etc) appear to be most problematic for establishing WTO- 
compatible trade policy in Russia? 
During the December 1998 meeting of the Russia WTO Accession Working Party in Geneva, 
the Russian Delegation advised that work is under way in various Ministries to try and 
establish what precisely is going on at the regional level. This work is specifically aimed at 
identifying those practices which are actionable under WTO rules, and those which are 
notifiable. 
How might the abuse of a monopoly position function as a trade barrier at a 
regional level? 
This is a somewhat complicated issue. In many regions the local Administration itself can act 
as a monopoly through the role it plays in local purchasing and supplying of product for local 
institutions. There is evidence that tenders for specific orders are in fact closed to foreign 
companies. In addition, sudden releases of local Government stock can depress local prices, 
an issue we are having to confront in the context of the regional distribution of food aid. This 
can distort local trading patterns and is obviously unacceptable. Government competition 
policies are now an integral part of the WTO process and this is an issue that will bear closer 
examination. 
How might such abuses be corrected? 
Clearly this will be a diflicult matter. The Government's Anti-Monopoly Committee is a 
usehl mechanism in this regard, though currently its decisions have proven difficult to 
enforce. It is worth highlighting that trade and competition is one of the new issues now 
under discussion in multilateral trading forums, but already a negotiating subject at the time 
of the Havana Charter". This "new issue's" importance derives from increasing recognition 
that the benefits of trade liberalisation internationally are being negated by domestic 
The Havana Charter was the final draft of a charter for the International Trade Organisation adopted in 
Havana, Cuba in 1948. 
measures inimical to an open competitive market environment. Such barriers may take the 
form of private anti-competitive behaviour, abuse of a monopoly position or dominant 
supplier powers and inappropriate regulatory fiameworks, all of which are issues of concern 
in the Russian Federation. In Russia, the situation is made worse by weak competition policy 
and its inadequate coverage of domestic economic activity. It is obviously not desirable for 
Russia to be in a situation where such abuses are not corrected before accession and the 
Federation is taken to Dispute Settlement. 
• How are the rights to establishment managed a t  the regional level? 
This involves the right of a commercial entity in another country to establish itself for'the 
purpose of producing for the local market or importing from another economy. Such 
establishment normally entails some form of investment, including acquisitions, mergers and 
takeovers. The right to establishment is an important component of GATS as well which 
enforces the right to a commercial presence of any type of business or professional 
establishment within the territory of any member of the GATS for the purpose of supplying a 
service. This includes juridical persons, branches and representative offices. Russia's regions 
have a remarkably varied and complex system of registration and establishment. Indeed, the 
rights to establishment outlined by the central Government are often at odds with local 
requirements. This often poses significant and complicated issues for foreign companies that 
in effect have to go through the protracted and expensive legal process twice. 
4. Conclusion 
Regional policy in Russia has a long and controversial history. This paper has suggested that 
such policies are harmful to the economy as a whole in that they distort investment and 
trading decisions to such an extent that they weaken eficiency and cloud decision-making, 
Notwithstanding this, the evidence indicates that such policies are extant in the Russian 
Federation. The August 1998 financial crisis in Russia has highlighted this problem with 
numerous regions in the country imposing their own price controls, tariff barriers, new 
standards and certification requirements, strengthening monopoly situations, making the right 
of establishment more difficult and generally restricting rather than liberalising the internal 
trading environment. All of these issues have grave implications for Russia's accession 
negotiations. The paper has placed particular emphasis on the important distinction between 
measures which are expressly forbidden by multilateral trading rules and those which are 
subject to reduction commitments or need to be notified for transparency reasons. While there 
are clearly problems, it is better that these are identified and resolved before Russia joins the 
WTO. 
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